

**Poor Relief and Guild Welfare in the early modern era, bureaucracies or not?
Church, State and Citizen in the Dutch Republic**

Paper for the conference 'Civil Society and Public Services in Early Modern Europe',
University of Leiden, November 30 and December 1 2007.
First and still very rough draft, not fully annotated.

Marco H.D. van Leeuwen
International Institute of Social History,
Department of Sociology, Utrecht University
mle@iisg.nl

Church, State and Citizen: Poor Relief and Guild Welfare in the Dutch Republic

Introduction

In this paper I will discuss the workings of charity, both municipal and ecclesiastical, in the Netherlands in the early modern era, and compare this form of welfare to that offered by guilds to their members. Both forms of welfare together have helped the majority of the population in various stages of the life cycle, either as child, in middle age or in old age. They were essential in helping a very large share of the population to survive. In fact they have been termed 'welfare state in miniature'.ⁱ For the majority of the population, they come as close as anything to social security in the early modern era. To what extent can they be seen as 'bureaucracies' and was there a 'bureaucratisation' over time?

Since the days of Max Weber, the historical process of bureaucratisation in the western world has received attention.ⁱⁱ Bureaucracies and bureaucratisation, however, are not the first terms that spring to one's mind when looking at the early modern period. But then, we need yardsticks to decide on this issue. Then let us first try to assess what can be meant with these terms. I will try to develop two yardsticks to measure the degree of bureaucratisation by charities and guilds. First, I will compare their workings to that of the symbol of bureaucratisation today, social services provided by the state. Secondly, I will discuss and apply criteria in use by historical social scientists to measure bureaucratisation to the Dutch case.

Before doing this, however, a few words are in place to sketch, even if it is roughly, the political and ideological framework shaping the relations between Church, State and Citizen in the Dutch Republic.

The Dutch Republic as a federative corporatist state

The Dutch Republic was far from being democratic, but neither was it a dictatorship.¹⁹ Nowadays it is called corporatist. Corporatism is a political system in which government devolves some of its powers to civic assemblies. Today, one usually takes government to mean national government, and so government authority is taken to mean the power of the state. However, in the Dutch Republic during the early modern period government largely meant town government. And these had transferred a number of key responsibilities to corporations, the most important of which were the guilds. Indeed, the term corporatism comes from the French word for a guild, *corporation*. However, there were many other corporations too, such as the civic militias (*schutterijen*), churches, universities, and poor relief institutions. The corporations had a considerable degree of freedom, with their own members, self-government, their own statutes, capital, and income. In effect, a big city consisted of a large number of corporations; it has even been called a "sort of super corporation".²⁰ As a political system, corporatism was an alternative not only to the system of democracy as we know it today, with universal suffrage and public accountability, but also to the bureaucratic, centralist state, headed by a sovereign, which dominated Europe at that time.

Cities were administered by an oligarchy of prominent Reformed families, and any vacancies were filled by co-option.ⁱⁱⁱ Those families accounted for only a small minority of the urban population. Nonetheless, the majority of the population were not without influence. They enjoyed certain rights and obligations, not just according to the political theory of the time but also in practice. These rights and obligations differed from city to city, but every city had them and in the minds of the urban citizenry they created a civic community, for precisely because citizens lived in a particular city, they enjoyed certain rights. For example, a city's population had the right of recourse to the jurisdiction and laws of their own city, regardless of the *locus delicti*. They were also eligible for poor relief, and, as guild members, had access

to lucrative sectors of the economy. Moreover, they, and only they, were eligible to hold public office, at least if they were members of the Dutch Reformed Church.

The city council was, it is true, unelected. All the same, a city's inhabitants could influence the council in several ways. In many areas of economic life, regulations on manufacturing and distribution were delegated to guilds, whose artisan members were drawn from the urban middle class, and citizens from the middle class served in the militia companies (*schutterijen*). A militia company was originally a sort of civic guard, whose function was, at the request of the sovereign, to defend the city in case of attack. In the early-modern period, however, it was more akin to the military police and was entrusted with maintaining order in the city. Both guild membership and that of the militia companies was the preserve of a minority of the city's inhabitants, the so-called burghers (*poorters*). One became a burgher through birth, by marrying a burgher, or by purchasing the title. Most of the urban population were "ordinary inhabitants". They had the right of petition, and could thus influence the city council. Every urban resident could petition the council or submit a complaint. Organizations could do so too. Indeed, much of the council's time was taken up with reading, investigating, and ruling on such petitions. Individuals or organizations could also petition to have certain regulations, or ordinances, rescinded, amended, or implemented. In fact, ordinances were rarely changed except as the result of a petition. In Amsterdam in the eighteenth century, for example, thousands were submitted, around half by guilds, a quarter by other organizations, and a quarter by individual burghers.^{iv}

Foreign diplomats often found it difficult to understand the process of decision making in the Dutch Republic, precisely because the centrifugal local corporatist forces were counterbalanced by a weak centripetal state forces. There was a parliament, the Estates-General, but it consisted of representatives of the Dutch provinces, claiming to be sovereign, and indeed to a large extent being sovereign, except when it came to matters of war and piece. Instead of one monarch there were two prominent but opposing political personae, the *stadhouder* and the prince of orange. There was no constitution, save for a rather vague treaty drawn up in 1579, when the perilous time, forced the provinces to put something on paper. Lacking better, this document, the *Unie of Utrecht*, came as close to a constitution as anything before the, yet again perilous, times of the French Revolution and its aftermath. This document from 1579 was rather vague on religion: to every province its own religious regime. In practice this meant, as said, that the dominant religion – and the sole provider of politicians – was the Dutch Reformed or Calvinist church. It also meant that certain privileges of the Catholic church were ended. The guilds were no longer allowed to act as catholic institutions by having a patron saint and a chapel devoted to him. Catholic charities were initially distrusted, as they were under suspicion of collaborating with the Pope, in a similar fashion as Muslim charities today sometimes have to face allegations of supporting Al Qaeda. Often (catholic) charitable property was confiscated, and either sold to the benefit of the coffers of the new protestant political regime or given to the Calvinist charities. In due time however, catholic charities surfaced even in dominantly protestant parts of the country, tolerated at first and stimulated later as they unburdened the municipal poor relief agencies. In the Dutch Republic every religious group was given the privilege to pay for its poor.

But they were also given the right to pray for their poorer and richer members alike, and to organize church services for their catholic, Lutheran, Jewish, Mennonite and other followers, as long as they had the common sense to do so calmly, and not disturb the public peace and the anger of the Dutch Calvinists. This high degree of religious tolerance, so surprising to foreigners used to one state religion, was deeply connected to the religious division of the Dutch population, from the beggar to, well not to the Prince or the Stadhouder who had to be Calvinists, but to the rich and mighty. At the turn of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the first time we dispose of such figures, about half of the population

was Calvinist, a third catholic, and some ten percent were split over almost every religious denomination under heaven. Earlier on, while we do not know the exact figures, it is clear that there were more Catholics, more Mennonites and also a higher share of the population who was not quite sure where they stood.^v

The relation between Church, State, City and Citizen was thus a complex one in the Dutch Republic, and this complexity was mirrored in the ways guilds and poor relief agencies distributed welfare. Before I will turn to a story so rich, and discuss the workings of guilds and charities as bureaucracies or not as it evolved from the sixteenth to the nineteenth centuries, I would like to approach the matter from a distance. That is to gloss over temporal and regional variation for the moment, and sketch with a broad stroke essential traits of guild welfare and poor relief, in the same way as is currently sometimes done for state social security services.

Essential characteristics of providers of social security, past and present

For a historian of the early modern world, the degree to which the state presently provides social security to its inhabitants is staggering. This was so at the zenith of state activity and it remains so at present, even after decades of retreat by the state to the advantage of market providers.

Table 1 presents in a stylised version traits of Dutch social services in first and the second half of the twentieth century. Generally the scope of the social security system increased in this century, as is indicated by the appearance of even more encompassing arrangements (in italics in the table). If we concentrate on the lower panel of the table, we see that many different risks are covered for the labour force, and in many cases for the population as a whole. Most arrangements are compulsory. They are financed by the employees, employers and by the state, that is by the public at large. The administration and implementation is complex and formal. I for one, do not fully understand, the deductions that I see on my wage bill every month. I cannot accurately judge whether they are levied correctly, are fully worth it or not, and who does what with the deducted amounts. Nor would I know, at the top of my hat, to whom to turn for such information or to redress any grievances I might have. My guess is that I am not alone. The system is rather opaque. But it is not opaque because it is informal. In many ways it is opaque because it is highly formal and systematic. The myriad web of intertwining formal and complex rules of administration, entitlement and disbursement – and the thousands of laws and regulations, institutions and civil servants - behind them is hard to grasp for an ordinary citizen. How does this symbol of welfare bureaucracy compare to welfare arrangements in the early modern era?

Table 2 lists traits of poor relief in the Dutch Republic, in the same stylised version as before. The risks covered do not differ much from that covered by social security today, but for the fact that today there is a separate entity per risk group while in the early modern era, by and large the same body that dealt with say the elderly also dealt with the handicapped or the underemployed. Entitled were those that either had been resident locally for some time – in case of municipal poor relief – or, in the case of ecclesiastical poor relief, had been an active member of their church for some time. The latter requirement, of course, has now disappeared, but only since 1965 when the last and significant remains of ecclesiastical assistance were taken out of the hands of the churches (generally much to their relief for that matter). The law governing this final transfer, the *Algemene Bijstandswet* of 1965, has become a symbol of the modern *rightful* way of helping the poor.^{vi} At the time all political parties believed it ended an era of arbitrary assistance. Finally, Church and State had become separated fully and a pauper in one corner of the country was treated identically to one in

another corner. There is certainly something to say for this way of seeing it, and most jurists would probably agree, but even in the Golden Age relief was generally not given according to the unpredictable whims and moods of a custodian of the poor. As a rule there were written rules and regulations, and certainly in the cities one could speak of customary rights. A guardian of the poor could not bypass the rules and regulations, except in rare cases. There was no right of appeal however, as we shall discuss later, and the conditions to receive included to a higher extent than today conditions relating to a 'proper' behaviour. Of course the homeless, the drunk or the prisoner usually receives less than the law abiding octogenarian or the poor but decent orphan, even today. But we do not demand anymore that they go to church. The degree of required deference has probably also diminished. It must be said however that the voices of the poor complaining about these behaviour conditions become louder from the end of the nineteenth century onwards only.^{vii} Perhaps the poor of the Golden Age are too distant to be heard, but equally or more likely is that the behavioural demands were, overall, not seen as very harsh in Dutch Republic.

Administration, implementation and financing of poor relief in the Dutch Republic was rather different from those of social security arrangements today. Today we have educated and paid civil servants working in hierarchical organizations, supervised by other civil servants, leading to the penultimate supervision of the secretary of state, and to the ultimate control by a parliament elected by the Dutch population at large. Although there was a high degree of local variation, it is fair to say that for poor relief in the Golden Age there were two distinct organizational models.

The first one was followed by many municipal relief agencies and some ecclesiastical ones. It involved governance by a board of administrators replenished every now and then from the local elites through cooptation.^{viii} Being on such a board was an unpaid honorary task. It meant supervision and it did not involve a heavy load of administration or implementation, as this was delegated to paid staff, often in permanent employment, who followed established procedures. Not only was there permanency in the staff, there the administrators themselves often served long terms.

The second one was followed by many ecclesiastical relief agencies, certainly protestant ones.^{ix} Here supervision, administration and implementation were generally not split, they were entrusted to volunteers such as the baker or the blacksmith who, after work, visited the poor, did the administration, and on distribution day handed the loafs of bread to the army of the poor. All of this was no small beer, serving in this organization model was not very attractive to elite members, and consequently the deacons and other poor relief agents were usually drawn from the middle classes. The heavy workload – and the generally lower social status – of this model meant that it was more difficult to find candidates and that they generally served a few years only, whereas in the elitist organizational model the administrators could serve for decades. The high turnover meant both some more arbitrariness and a degree of discontinuity in work practices. The deacons and others were in fact amateurs in all senses of the word.

For both organizational models, the amateur as well as the elitist, there was large local variation in sources of income: gifts, income from own capital, sometimes subsidy from local government.^x What typifies the finances – quite unlike that of social security systems today – was the large local variation both in sources and level of income; notwithstanding this variation a central, if no generally predominant, place for voluntary gifts; and probably notwithstanding this predominance in many places a certain tendency to spend less than was received and thus for the capital to grow. The poor relief system as a whole, in so much as one can speak of a system in the face of so much variation and so little central coordination, was in large measure pay-as-you-go but probably to a growing extent capital based.

Urban artisans sought protection from poor relief agencies, but for them there existed an alternative in the form of the mutual insurance of their guilds. Table 3 lists the essential characteristics of this type of welfare arrangement. The risks they covered were rather limited, most of all the costs of a burial, but also sickness, both in the sense of insuring for loss of income and for costs of medical treatment. As we will see later, there was the occasional scheme for widows or old aged, but generally these were too costly and too problematic. For sickness and burial, there existed, however viable insurance schemes for urban artisans, schemes that provided much more than poor relief but for a more limited time. The schemes were mutual schemes, so the urban craftsmen (and very often all of them) not only had to pay for them but, at least in theory, controlled them.

Unlike poor relief or social security systems, they had, if push came to shove, to make ends meet out of their own pocket. To do this, they not only had the power to limit claims but sometimes also had to use that power in order to avoid bankruptcy. Of course both states and churches also have eventually make sure their income is sufficient to pay for their expenditure on welfare and other measures, but their options are broader. States can borrow, reallocate among a wide variety of expenses, and welfare expenditure is born in some measure by all the tax payers. To limited degree this is true for ecclesiastical relief as well. But it wasn't true for guilds, so their schemes had to be very flexible to a higher degree.

The administration and to degree the implementation of guild schemes was entrusted to guild members, that is benevolent amateurs. They did follow, as we shall see, formal schemes with detailed requirements. But in theory at least all the guild members – and this often meant all the artisans in a particular branch – could decide on changing and implementing the rules. It is not clear however if in practice an 'aristocracy of artisans' were more influential than other members. Guilds were, however, pillars of the corporatist regime, and thus their decision making power had been delegated to them by the municipal authorities and these authorities had the last word in case of real trouble. Guild members could also use their power of petitioning to inform the city government of any perceived wrongdoings with regard to guild actions in general and those of guild welfare schemes in particular.

When compared to social security in the 20th century, almost any earlier welfare arrangement pales with regard to formal regulations and red tape. In that respect it comes as no surprise that both guild welfare and poor relief (and especially the relief agencies following the professional or elite model) were although by no means without structure and regulations were less bureaucratic – in any reasonable sense of the word – than social security systems. The purpose of this paragraph is not to demonstrate this point in theory, but to give a first sense of how much less bureaucratic guild welfare and poor relief were and on which points. In that respect it may be instructive – and some could argue also more just or at least more meaningful – to compare them to other forms of welfare that existed during the Dutch Republic.

Table 4 lists essential characteristics of help from neighbours, friends and family in the Dutch Republic. Neighbours, family, and friends offered informal help in case of maternity, sickness, death, and poverty, as they still do nowadays in the Netherlands and also did in other parts of Europe in the early modern era. Because it is informal such help remains often unseen to the historian but can be pervasive although at the same time precarious. It is difficult to be a full time unpaid `nurse` and `cook`, and pay for the food and other things on top of that, next to taking care of one`s own life as usual. At least it is difficult to do so for long.

It may come as no surprise that poor relief and guild welfare were generally more `bureaucratic` than help of neighbours, friends and family.^{xi} The surprise however is that there existed both in the countryside and in some cities organizations offering such help with fixed and sometimes even written rules governing who was entitled to which type of help and who was being expected to give it. In the countryside, usually a fixed number of farms in proximity of each other were expected to provide help on the basis of reciprocity. Which kind of help to be given was not always written down, but it was well known. In some cities organizations of neighbours – in the sense of persons residing in a certain section of town – existed that provided help. They were known as `guilds of neighbours` (*buurtgilden*), and the reference to guilds was, although strictly speaking nonsense as they were not associations of craftsmen, not coincidental either as they had their own set of rules and regulations.

Yardsticks for bureaucratisation of welfare arrangements

The comparison of poor relief and guild welfare to on the one hand often but not invariably informal help by neighbours and friends and on the other hand social security systems as the zenith of bureaucratic help has served as an introduction to poor relief and guild welfare and given a sense of perspective of their place in the `landscape of assistance`. Now we will discuss poor relief and guild welfare in more detail, beginning with poor relief. This discussion will serve to better judge if there was a trend towards bureaucratisation in the early modern era and if so, when, to which degree and why, or if not so, why not. The discussion will end with such a conclusion. Although the conclusion will be the made at the end, it is instructive to say a few words on what we are looking for.

Since the days of Max Weber, the historical process of bureaucratisation in the western world has received attention among historians and sociologists.^{xii} As their work, and that of participants of this conference, make abundantly clear their definitions of what constitutes bureaucracy are complex and varied, but they have a common focus. In Dutch research on bureaucratisation in the past, the criteria of Van Braam are often used.^{xiii} They consist of a dozen characteristics of the persons involved and eight characteristics of their work. The latter are: continuity; formal rules and regulations; a hierarchy; of fixed specialised occupational positions; using delegated authority and means; and written documents; without ownership of office; and with `rational discipline and control`. The former are: tasks are fulfilled by individuals; appointed; in what is their main occupation; controlled by superiors; tenured; using a written contract; knowledgeable; receiving fixed wages and pension rights; awarded according to their rank; and number of years employed; following a certain career pattern; formally seen as civil servants.

There is no need to follow the Van Braam scheme lock stock and barrel. It is not the international standard to measure bureaucratisation - such a standard does not exist - and even in the Netherlands other researchers have used similar but not identical criteria. In addition, some twenty characteristics is really a lot. But, as said, the Van Braam criteria do reflect many traits of bureaucratisation as seen by historians and historical sociologists and political scientists. For simplicity`s sake I have tried to stay close to this scheme, while applying it to welfare institutions. Table 5 lists the criteria: continuity, professionalism, goal-orientation and equity.

Continuity is in a sense the most basis. A welfare arrangement that periodically does not exist cannot be said to be bureaucratic. Poor relief was indeed subject to a free-rider problem. As Olson pointed out a collective good is difficult to organize if those that cannot be excluded from profiting from it cannot be forced to pay for it either. In that case a free ride is a rational - although unsympathetic - act.^{xiv} This problem also operated in the field of welfare. It operated between cities, as De Swaan has pointed out. If one city was tempted to close its doors in times of crises for the poor, it forced the poor to swamp the neighbouring city which now had to suspend relief although it had had good reasons to provide it. The free rider problem also operated within a city where elites had good reasons - discussed later - to sustain relief, but individual members of the elites were tempted to opt for a free ride, and if all did so, it would have ended relief.

The second criterion is professionalism, in the sense of Van Braam that is with paid and trained personnel as opposed to volunteers. Not only does the staff need to be equipped to the job, but the institution as well, and to capture this we look at the question if it is specialised according to the type of welfare risk.

The third criterion is goal-orientedness. Is the arrangement primarily meant to raise the welfare of those men, women and children it helps, and does it do so with relatively low costs of administration, internal costs so to speak, and does it do so in collaboration with other welfare providers in the sense that it does not raise the costs for the welfare arrangement as a whole.

The fourth criterion is equity: is the arrangement equally open to anyone at risk (who pays the premiums in those cases there is a premium to be paid) or does it favour some, are the rights to claim or continue to have entitlements fixed – in the sense of written or at the very least commonly understood - or arbitrary, and is the level or the duration of the benefit allowances fixed, and has a client whose claim has been refused the right to appeal to an independent body.

Poor relief in the Dutch Republic as a bureaucracy

A general outline

Poor relief was the most comprehensive social security scheme in the early-modern period. It took the form of assistance to paupers living independently (the “housebound poor”), and of help to special groups in institutions such as orphanages and almshouses. We shall first discuss poor relief in general, and then orphanages and almshouses.

During the Golden Age, no nation was more charitable than the Netherlands. England began to approximate it – in terms of per capita giving – only at the end of the eighteenth century (Lindert 2004). Within the Republic, poor relief agencies in every town and city, as well as in many villages, were obliged to appeal to the generosity of the public. Furthermore, in principle each religious community took responsibility for its own destitute, while municipal poor relief existed as a last resort for those whom the Church failed to help. In Amsterdam, for example, almost all the many religious denominations maintained a special agency to provide for the ‘ordinary’ poor, while many also had almshouses for their elderly parishioners, and orphanages for the boys and girls of their particular religious community. There were also two municipal poor relief agencies, an orphanage for orphans of citizens, and another for orphans of non-citizens. Finally, like many other cities, Amsterdam had a number of almshouses founded and in many cases managed by individuals. The poor relief system was thus fragmented across religious and secular authorities, with a further distinction according to social status and religious denomination (Prak 1998; van Leeuwen 2000)

Charitable giving was voluntary, but well-organized. Alms boxes were situated at strategic locations frequented by many, such as inns, post offices, and ferries. Churches held collections during service, and frequent door-to-door collections were made. The municipal

Poor Relief made collections too. Collections were authorized by the municipal council and subject to a roster. Municipal authorities ensured that collections were properly organized and checked the annual accounts; apart from that they were reluctant to get too involved. In the Dutch Republic, a *modus vivendi* was found with both Church and Town exercising a global supervision over charitable giving, but no more and no less. Part of the responsibility felt by local government for the welfare of its poor was delegated, as it were, to the churches and to the municipal boards of administrators, often formally an independent body. This is what we today term corporatism, with government responsibilities delegated to semi-autonomous agencies in which members can participate (Prak 1999). Co-religionists could influence church-based poor relief, citizens could administer urban poor relief, and, moreover, by petitioning the town council they could also complain about mismanagement. This distribution of charitable responsibilities between Church, State, and Citizen survived essentially until the introduction of the *Algemene Bijstandswet* in 1965.

Organized poor relief existed as early as the Middle Ages.^{xv} Canon law included provisions requiring a parish to care for its destitute. If parishes were unable to meet the cost, the church wardens would divide it among the parishioners. In addition to parish-based help, the nobility and the monasteries had certain obligations towards those of their servants who were ill or elderly. Institutions for the poor had been founded in Western Europe ever since the growth of towns and cities in the eleventh century. These institutions were initially less specialized than they were later to become, caring for orphans, the sick, the elderly, transient visitors, as well as *proveniers*, i.e. paying residents. Sometimes, at the request of the city council, a hospital (*gasthuis*) dispensed alms to the housebound poor. However, responsibility for the regular distribution of food and clothing lay largely with the Masters of the Holy Ghost (“Heilige Geestmeesters”), later known as the Masters of the Housebound Paupers (“Huismeesters”).

In the cities of the Late Middle Ages, charitable endowments were administered separately from parish assets in general by overseers of the poor. The endowments were a feature of Catholic religiosity, an aspect of the cult of memory whereby benefactors made donations with a view to ensuring their own salvation in the afterlife. The recipients were expected to pray for the souls of the dead in exchange for posthumous gifts. The names of the dead thus lived on as it were in the alms provided to the poor themselves. The expenses associated with masses said for the souls of the dead were an important component of the total expenditure of poor relief institutions, which left correspondingly less for the poor. The cities meanwhile had a tangled maze of charitable foundations and endowments, set up by individuals, guilds, and clergy, administered and for the most part staffed by members of religious orders. The Church had a leading role, but if necessary the municipal authorities intervened to stave off any crisis.

In the first half of the sixteenth century, a new approach to poor relief was felt to be necessary, in part due to the growth in the population and the rapid expansion of the major cities. Traditional poor relief arrangements were unable to cope adequately with the effect of the rapidly growing number of paupers. Another influence was humanist criticism of the monasteries and mendicant orders, and what was said to be their unrestricted, indiscriminate, and haphazard approach to distributing charity to beggars. This critical attitude to alms giving led to a shift in emphasis towards limiting vagrancy and the number of beggars. In 1526 the Spanish humanist Juan Luis Vives, a resident of Bruges, published his *De Subventionem Pauperum* [On Assistance to the Poor]. Vives argued that mendicancy should be countered by strict prohibitions and better supervision of the poor. Only the “real poor”, by which he meant those unable to provide a livelihood because of physical incapacity, illness, or old age, should receive relief, and certainly not indolent beggars. He called for a more coordinated system of poor relief, one that would make a distinction for instance between the able-bodied and the

infirm poor.^{xvi} Most importantly, the uncoordinated relief by the myriad of hospitals and ecclesiastical charities, friaries, and individuals must be brought to an end. He called for the state to set up an organized system of poor relief, which would co-exist alongside private initiatives. The Church must be placed under curatorship as it were. And in many German, Italian, and French cities, but also in the southern Netherlands, poor relief was indeed reorganized at the time.

There was a view opposing that of Vives, propounded by a prominent Reformational humanist called Johannes Oecolampadius. His *De non habendo pauperum delectu* was published in Basle in 1523.^{xvii} Whereas Vives argued in favour of more secular and centralized poor relief and of churches being deprived of their powers in this area, Oecolampadius supported ecclesiastical poor relief. The conflict between a greater role for the Church and a predominant role for the State in relation to poor relief was to influence relationships between urban authorities and the Church until the twentieth century.

The fundamental reform of poor relief in the southern Netherlands did not go unnoticed in the north of the country. In 1527 the States of Holland made efforts to inquire about the changes implemented in Bruges and Ieper. But the northern Netherlands experienced less rapid urbanization than the south of the country, so poverty too was a less pressing problem. In 1531, inspired by these innovative ideas and reforms, the Holy Roman Emperor Charles V decreed that parochial charity should be centralized within a single common fund. The poor had to register with the city, and to wear an identifying badge. Begging was prohibited and vagabonds barred from entering cities. As far as we know, that edict led to poor relief being reformed only in Friesland; even there the reforms were not implemented in their entirety.

Elsewhere in the northern Netherlands, it was not until later that reforms were introduced.^{xviii} There was no great change in poor relief until after the Dutch Revolt and the start of the Reformation. In the cities that, after 1572, had switched their allegiance and joined the rebel cause, Catholic endowments were appropriated and handed over to civic institutions and the Reformed Church, which, as a public but not a state Church, acquired a privileged position. Although the municipal administrators were often also members of the Reformed Church, they set political interests above those of the Church. There was no longer a union of Church and State. During the Reformation a multiplicity of religious movements and denominations emerged, each of which developed its own system of poor relief in the course of time. This gave rise to a confessionally segmented system of poor relief which was exceptional in Europe. Almost everywhere else in Europe at that time, welfare was supervised by a single Church, either Catholic or Protestant. One explanation for this uniquely Dutch feature was the administrative decentralization of power in the Netherlands, where there was no strong central authority. In the extreme case of Amsterdam there were parallel poor relief systems for the Reformed, the Remonstrants, Walloon Reformed, Catholics, Anabaptists, Lutherans, and Sephardic and Ashkenazi Jews, all operating alongside the municipal poor relief agencies. In general then, the Reformation saw an expansion of both outdoor and indoor relief, with more distinct forms of relief depending on the life-cycle subrisk. Each religious denomination of any significance wanted its own patronage and protection.^{xix} This was equally true for people from the same city or the same class, for relatives, and for those working in the same profession. But it also applied to co-religionists. The biblical injunction “As we have therefore opportunity, let us do good unto all men, especially unto them who are of the household of faith” was clearly heeded here.^{xx}

The Reformed Church turned out to be a much leaner organization than the Catholic Church had been, and partly for that reason its charitable endowments rose substantially. In the early decades after the Reformation, a great many schools, orphanages, hospitals, and almshouses were either founded or extended. Furthermore, the prosperity of the Golden Age

also enabled the predominantly Protestant charities to build up considerable fortunes and develop an impressive system of poor relief. In this way, the corporatist system of poor relief flourished.

The Golden Age provided more fertile ground for poor relief than did the Late Middle Ages. Municipal authorities, churches, and individuals created fairly minimal but extensive poor relief arrangements which grew steadily. Each parish had its collection boxes for the poor at churches, inns, shops, and departure points for the passenger barges. Church collections were a frequent phenomenon, while door-to-door collectors too called on the homes of churchgoers. The municipal authorities had to expand their own system of poor relief to support those – including, initially, many Catholic paupers – whom confessional agencies declined to assist. The municipal authorities had no intention of helping all the city's destitute, since poor relief was regarded as an ecclesiastical responsibility. But nor could it: the city simply lacked the financial resources to do so.

In the Netherlands, the first true orphanages were founded in the late fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries.^{xxi} In the Late Middle Ages it was customary to place orphans with relatives, where possible, or else with a convent or monastery. Later, it became increasingly the responsibility of the parish to which the orphans belonged to place them, initially with individuals. The Church and overseers of the poor were entrusted with the care of orphans and the financing of that care. Orphans were sent to work for a master as soon as possible, so that they could help contribute to their upkeep. Usually, they were also permitted to beg for alms, though the fifteenth century saw that right becoming increasingly constrained. In addition to the ecclesiastical-based care of orphans, the civic authorities managed orphans' assets through the "orphan chamber" (*weeskamer*) until they became of age. The sixteenth century saw a great many orphanages being founded. In the case of orphan care too, the increase in the role of the secular authorities on the one hand during and after the Reformation and the confessional segmentation of poor relief on the other led to a great diversification of agencies. There was also a degree of social diversification, with the founding of municipal orphanages for the middle classes. Together, these developments led to the emergence of a corporatist system of poor relief in which, in principle, the monitoring of orphan care became a matter for local government while its implementation was delegated to interested parties.

The orphanages set up by every self-respecting city in the early-modern period were administered by that city's college of regents. Day-to-day administration lay with the *binnenvader* (house father) and *binnenmoeder* (house mother) and their staff. Funding the orphanage was no simple matter. An orphanage was dependent on gifts and bequests, but the income on orphans' assets could also be used to help finance the orphanage. Furthermore, collections were held regularly, and the orphanages invested prudently in land or securities. Finally, the orphanage was also funded in part by the work of the orphans themselves.

Almshouses were the jewels in the crown of charitable giving. From far and wide, foreigners came to visit and marvelled at the number of such buildings for elderly men and women and widows, and the comfortable life they provided compared with the situation in England, France, and Germany. Almshouses invested the benefactor with more than a hint of immortality, and they gave rise to notarial transactions, regulations, naming issues, as well as inspiring works of art, paintings, laudatory poems, and plays. Generous benefactors imposed conditions: on where the building was to be located, for whom it was intended, what the residents were and were not permitted to do; they also determined the name of the almshouse. We know a great deal about almshouses. Moreover, many of them still exist today, together with their archives, and much has already been published about them. An initial inventory lists 230 almshouses throughout the country. Their number rose in the course of time.

How much continuity was there?

Serial data needed to answer this question exists for Amsterdam poor relief organizations over long years. This information pertains to the Reformed charity during the Golden Age and it pertains to that body three other major charitable institutions for a subsequent period. During the Golden Age the poor relief organization run by the Reformed Church grew from a zero-point at the time of the Reformation into a structure handling around three hundred thousand guilders a year by the middle of the seventeenth century. Poor relief provided by the Reformed Church then continued to grow in importance until the last quarter of the eighteenth century when it experienced a dramatic fall, reaching its lowest point during the period of Batavian and French rule. Poor relief recovered slowly in the following decades (while we do not have precise sources for the years 1816-1829 it is known the Reformed Church continued to give poor relief. From 1687 data are also available for the three other major poor relief organizations. Relief provided by these organizations grew until the last quarter of the eighteenth century; this was followed by a period of stabilization until a dramatic drop in the time of Batavian and French rule and subsequent stabilization. The total level of support provided by all four poor relief organizations grew from around 400,000 guilders at the end of the seventeenth century to one million guilders at the end of the eighteenth century. Expenditure then fell back to the level at the end of the seventeenth century for a short time, and then rose again to reach 500,000 to 600,000 guilders around 1850. The exact level of relief provided varied from year to year, but there is no question of periodic collapse. There was only one clear period of crisis: the time of Batavian and French rule, but even then poor relief did not collapse. This is not insignificant, since during the French and Batavian period economic and social life was severely disrupted in the Republic as a whole, and in Amsterdam in particular. This was one of the worst, if not the worst, periods in Amsterdam's history, but even under such extreme pressure poor relief continued to function. Outside Amsterdam as well no trace can be found of collapsing poor relief institutions.^{xxii}

Serial data on per capita support for the time of the Republic is available only for one organization, the Oudezijds municipal poor relief charity for 1687 to 1850 (except for 1796 to 1808 where no figures are available). The data reflect both cash donations and the value of donations in kind. Up to the end of the eighteenth century there was little change in the composition and level of support. The value of assistance changed in line with variations in the price of bread that was distributed. The figure shows that the nominal value of support remained at more or less the same level for a long time and only started on an upward trend in the last quarter of the eighteenth century. As said, this was due to the sharp rise in the price of bread. Support gradually fell during the Batavian and French period and then stabilized at a much lower level. Deep cuts were made in support as a consequence of the large number of assisted persons, the lack of funds within the poor relief organizations.

As to the implementation, at the municipal charity, an application for support began with a call on the district warden. Ever since the seventeenth century, Amsterdam has been divided into districts, each headed by a warden. He issued the certificates of poverty which applicants for relief had to produce for the municipal charity. He also gave out vouchers for free education at charity schools. Before issuing the requisite certificates, the warden was expected to visit the poor male or female applicant. Applicants for poor relief then reported to the offices of the municipal charity, armed with the declaration from the warden and one or more extracts from the baptismal or birth registers, or from the marriage banns or marriage registers. The regents would then decide whether or not to register them for assistance. Applicants who were sick were further required to produce a certificate from a municipal doctor, surgeon or midwife. Witnesses would sometimes be brought along to add force to an application. Registration took place at the beginning of summer and the beginning of winter,

when the regents, sitting behind their desks, would hear applications. If all the conditions had been satisfied, district welfare officers would register the applicant and enter the following personal details in the registration book: first name and surname, age, marital status, place of birth, any illnesses or disabilities, names and ages of marriage partners and any existing children.

These particulars were passed on to the district welfare officers or the consentvrouwen (licence women), who were only concerned with the so-called 'licence-holders', applicants who were registered as holding an official 'licence' to be paid their relief money at home. The licence women then visited the applicants at home to hand over the relief money in person. The sick, the elderly and families with a large number of children, who found it difficult to attend at the relief office each week, were able to take advantage of this arrangement. The regents of the municipal charity would on occasion ask for extra evidence from applicants, should doubts arise during their registration or as a result of subsequent inquiries. They would try to discover whether the applicant was indeed out of work and if so, why. Former employers would be approached. If the applicant's willingness to seek work was in doubt, he had to provide proof that he was applying for a job. If there were doubts whether the applicant had actually lived in Amsterdam for the requisite number of years, the police could be asked to find out if he was, in fact, a newcomer to the city. Poor-relief institutions used elaborate registration procedures. An application for relief had to be supported with documents and declarations by witnesses. At irregular intervals, various persons would check on the accuracy of the information supplied. Every resident of Amsterdam applying for relief was visited by an inspector, and even after registration, inspectors would come to the home of an applicant at least once a year and investigate his or her current circumstances.

Why did poor relief persist? The two main components of the funds managed by the Church-run institutions were 'living money and 'dead' money (interest on capital). Property not only provided interest, but could also in the short run supply much more if sold. This was done for example in the case of legacies including land or houses that would be too time-consuming for a charitable organization to administer.^{xxiii} Collections formed an important part of the 'living' sources of charitable income.^{xxiv} Most donations were probably made during church services. The Protestant vicar or Catholic priest would urge his congregation to give to the poor. Deacons or sidesmen held a little bag on the end of a long stick before the worshippers noses. Giving in this way was semi-public. It was probably not possible to avoid giving without the fact being noticed, but people could give small coins, foreign coins of little value or simply pieces of metal. All churches in Amsterdam for example held collections. In addition there were door-to-door collections as well as collection boxes all over town. In times of trouble, Amsterdam charities tried to increase income by collecting more frequent and by making a more forceful appeal. The effect of this was limited however, since many of the factors that caused the expenditure of the charities to rise (times of dearth, an increase of poor during winters or wars) also limited the benevolence of charitable donors.

Prak ascribes the continuity of poor relief in Den Bosch in the first instance to the ready availability of capital held by the poor relief organizations. The interest on capital was almost enough to fund all the support given to the poor. As a result of this, poor relief organizations in Den Bosch were not excessively dependent on gifts from individuals, a source of income which might dry up in times of crisis. The availability of capital in Den Bosch probably put the town in a uniquely favourable position. In Leiden for example, only one-tenth of income came from returns on capital in the second half of the eighteenth century, and in Rotterdam for the few decades afterwards the figure was never over one half.^{xxv} The situation in Amsterdam lay between those described for Leiden and Rotterdam while in all cases remaining less favourable than in Den Bosch. The public bodies obtained about one-third of their income from return on capital for the period from 1687 to 1799. The figure

followed a downward trend over time, since at the end of the seventeenth century the return on capital had still accounted for just over half their income. The figure also fell in absolute terms from around 60,000 guilders to around 50,000 guilders a year. This may be due to lower returns on a larger volume of capital, but a different scenario is more likely. In the eighteenth century the municipal charity acquired hardly any capital in the form of legacies, rarely buying and occasionally selling. It is likely that its capital hardly increased at all over the course of the eighteenth century.

Measures to stem the influx of the poor

Dutch towns had been able to use a simple remedy to stem the influx of the poor since the end of the seventeenth century: they simply sent them back unless they were covered by the relief agreements concluded with other regions. A letter of surety (*acte van indeminiteit, acte van cautie*) is a promise by a person or an organization to pay for the poor relief of named individuals if they require support within a certain number of years. Normally this took the form of a certificate, or surety, given by a town council or a poor relief organization run by the town to a resident leaving the town. For example, the town of Leiden gave such letters of surety valid for periods of two to three years from 1682 to 1785 and required immigrants to present their own letters of surety.^{xxvi} Only its citizens had the right of free establishment in the town or the right of admission. Citizenship was obtained by birth as the child of a citizen or by purchasing it. Migrants wishing to purchase citizenship had to present a letter of surety. The town was divided into 130 districts, and district wardens made sure that nobody offered accommodation to migrants without a letter of citizenship or surety. The letters of surety were collected by the Leiden poor relief organization. The documents that have been preserved cover a large proportion of the Republic's territory, including the towns and rural areas of South and North Holland, places in the provinces of Guelderland, North Brabant and Overijssel. A similar system governing residence was in operation in other parts of the Netherlands, including the city of Rotterdam and the province of Drenthe.^{xxvii}

The system of letters of surety developed at the end of the seventeenth century in reaction to local rules governing domicile. In 1682 the States of Holland declared that “all such persons who have moved from any place to the towns or to the countryside shall, after a period of one year, be deemed no longer to belong to the place from which they have moved.”^{xxviii} When a poor person migrated to a town or village in Holland, that town could only recover the costs of support from his town of origin for one year. Other provinces followed this example and introduced similar rules.^{xxix} At that time towns were faced with a growing influx of poor migrants whom they now had to support after one year had elapsed. It appears that towns started to demand letters of surety to put a stop to this situation. Leiden required them for example to keep out poor people from outside the town, beggars, wheedlers, vagrants, vagabonds, idlers and other undesirables that the town would have to support.^{xxx} In 1697 Rotterdam defended its policy on admission and its use of letters of surety in this way: “many poor and undesirable people [come] from all sides to this town and jurisdiction with the intention of being supported by its protestant charities and almshouses, and before that spend much time in begging and other such practices; this is greatly to the detriment not only of the poor people of this town who are entitled to receive support but also leads to the total ruin of the aforementioned protestant charities and almshouses.”^{xxxi}

What was the background against which the system of letters of surety developed? Some speculations follow.^{xxxii} Dutch towns became much larger during the Golden Age. Migration was an important factor in this trend, because the death rate probably outstripped the birth rate in the towns and because of the ‘drift to the Dutch East Indies large numbers of young men leaving for the Far East, never to return. Migrants were needed to fill the void and to meet the high demand for labour in the flourishing urban economy. Town councils scarcely

had a reason to stem the flow of migrants by introducing strict residence conditions. In places where work was scarce, newcomers left of their own accord. Poor relief for the sick, infirm, elderly, widows and large families with inadequate resources - native-born citizens and newcomers alike - was an acceptable price to pay. Things changed when economic growth gave way to stagnation.

After the middle of the seventeenth century, the demand for migrant labour fell, and what demand there was could increasingly be met by seasonal migrants - people who came every year and returned home once the work had been done. Work was scarce outside the busy season, and, more than before, tended to be distributed among old-timers who knew their way around the increasingly fragmented labour market better than the migrants did. When there was not enough work to go round, the newcomers started to rely on survival strategies that were less popular with the locals, such as begging. They became increasingly dependent on charity and came to be seen as rivals on the labour market, as beggars and as a financial burden on the poor relief organizations. The freerider problem described by Swaan raised its head. If every town closed its doors to poor people from outside and forced them back to their place of origin, a roving army of rootless people would develop.

Under these circumstances the central authority intervened, i.e. certain provinces would take measures to stop towns passing groups of poor people back and forth. The States of Holland led the way in 1682. The authorities intervened, as suggested by De Swaan, although not by building workhouses, but by passing rudimentary local poor laws (if that is not too strong a term).

These measures limited the opportunities for impoverished people to return to their place of birth within the same province. Towns were however still faced with streams of migrants that would make impossible demands on support funds if nothing was done. One option was to introduce admission rules to stem the flow of migrants, including letters of surety. In many instances it is unknown if or when individual towns used these options, and so we cannot describe exactly how and when this system developed. However, we do know that the system operated during the eighteenth century. It stemmed migration, but did not enjoy universal support. In 1785 textile manufacturers in Leiden complained that letters of surety made it difficult for skilled workers to move to the town. Migrants could not enter the town without letters of surety. In Rijnland the authorities even stopped demanding letters of surety because "it led to a shortage of building workers".^{xxxiii}

Amsterdam, for that matter, had its own problem. It was, and always had been, a city of migrants, and was experiencing a large influx of newcomers looking for work. In time, some of these migrants - or their wives and children - applied for support from the poor relief organizations.^{xxxiv} According to the municipal welfare organization, sailors and textile workers received most support, and the availability of poor relief was one reason for them coming to the town. Sending newcomers back was not an option as the town needed their labour. Indeed, the council took great pains to attract the French Protestant Huguenots, hoping that they would help the textile industry to flourish. In 1681, when the council asked the guardians of the municipal charity to put forward suggestions for stopping the growth in the indigent population the guardians replied that whatever steps were taken, nothing should be done to stem migration by sailors. Sailors knew that their wives and children would be well looked after in Amsterdam, and so they came to the city. This was as it should be as they had proved vital during the wars against England when the navy was undermanned. The councillors said that in their part of the city women with children whose husbands were at sea accounted for more than half of the support given to the poor. They were helped by:

“supporting [their] wives and children so as to be sure that they [i.e. the men] will be available in time of need. This was seen in the war against the English protector Cromwell when the Admiralty was short of men, which was why it [the Admiralty]

asked for the order of the city council to be withdrawn. [The council] had [initially] ordered that no people would be supported by the municipal charity over the winter. But then it [i.e. the Admiralty] would not find anyone to man the fleet. The order was indeed withdrawn to attract and encourage the shipping trade here. There are grounds to wonder whether when men with wives and children are brought to the city in the service of other powers [employers, possible foreign powers], a guarantee should not be sought in the form of taking part of the wages earned by the men for the support of the wives and children. Otherwise the wives will quickly become a charge to the charitable institutions, as in the recent war between the rulers of Denmark and Sweden when they were a great burden on the municipal charity”.^{xxxv}

Amsterdam could not participate in the system of letters of surety as this would restrict the influx of labour needed for the fleet. Other towns were probably not concerned at Amsterdam’s failure to take part in the scheme as the net flow of migrants turned to Amsterdam. On balance, the number of people moving to Amsterdam exceeded the number leaving the town, and so the potential number of poor people in Amsterdam increased. This brings us to an important explanation as to why there was no periodic breakdown of poor relief as a result of the geographical freerider problem under the Republic. During the Golden Age, a dynamic labour market absorbed large numbers of migrants, and even after this time people who were not admitted to other Dutch towns were always able to move to Amsterdam in the hope of finding work there, and migration to the Dutch East Indies was also an option as a last resort. In this way Amsterdam acted as a kind of ‘safety valve’, relieving excess pressure on local poor relief during the Republic. Amsterdam absorbed the ‘excess poor’ like a sponge, shipping large numbers of them to the Orient. Those who remained could rely on a well-developed charitable structure in the city with an income based on interest on its own capital and a culture of charitable giving. Generous donations for the poor came from the world of international trade and high finance as well as from the middle classes.

During the period of Batavian and French rule, deep cuts were made in the value of poor relief and the charitable institutions had to draw on their assets. Poor relief in Amsterdam almost collapsed, but this was not an example of the collapse of local poor relief described by De Swaan. The situation he describes is always caused by an influx of poor people from other places, whereas in fact migration to Amsterdam dried up at the end of the eighteenth century and became an exodus in the time of Batavian and French rule. The crisis in poor relief was not the consequence of other towns expelling their poor, but an internal affair caused by a lack of opportunities for work - including the decline of the Dutch East Indies Company at the end of the eighteenth century - and a rise in food prices. In addition, as has been stated before, it was a temporary breakdown and not a periodic meltdown.

The French revolution and attempts to institute a state system of poor relief

There had been criticism of poor relief since the end of the eighteenth century, when, it was claimed, relief was dispensed without consultation, encouraging indigence at increased cost, a criticism heard just as often in England and France.^{xxxvi} In fact, distributions were scarcely as generous and indiscriminate as critics claimed, being minimal and probably subject to checks sufficient to limit fraud. Costs did, it is true, escalate alarmingly, but that was because poverty became more widespread and there was a rise in the cost of the bread distributed to the poor.

It is not surprising that contemporaries found it difficult to understand this process, since being part of it they were unable to view it with detachment. Among the critics were well-to-do Dutch burghers who saw their political aspirations floundering in the face of resistance from the ruling patricians, who also controlled the administration of poor relief. That might have been a further motive for criticizing charity. But there was another reason,

one which would eventually radically change the existing system of poor relief in the Netherlands.

Increasingly, the idea began to take root that poor relief should be the responsibility of the state and not of local churches. With just a little exaggeration, and allowing for a degree of imprecision in the interests of conciseness, one could argue that this idea grew out of the French Revolution. Church and State should be separated and the Church and the established order deprived of their privileges in favour of the State and its citizens. The logic of this argument implied appropriating the assets of ecclesiastical charities, the institution of general taxation to finance poor relief, and the creation of a state agency to provide all bona fide Dutch paupers with either alms or work, all to be paid for out of capital appropriated from the Church and from the poor-relief tax. National legislation would be introduced entitling the poor to relief, effectively both ending the dominance of the Church and eliminating the wide local and denominational variations in relief. Not every Patriot was willing to go that far, although some were unswerving in their determination to pursue the logic of state relief to its limits.

In 1796 the revolutionary parliament – the National Assembly – decreed that “We can no longer and will no longer tolerate either a privileged or an established Church in the Netherlands.” A citizen representative in the assembly wrote: “Church and State will be separated. We no longer recognize any established Church, nor the wicked mother that denies liberty of conscience.”^{xxxvii} The path was now clear to liberate the poor from the clutches of ecclesiastical poor relief.

In 1800 a national poor law was introduced, declaring poor relief to be a state responsibility.^{xxxviii} A general poor relief fund was to be established to help those paupers whom the churches declined to assist. In the same year, charities were asked to complete a questionnaire about their assets and to declare whether they were able to care for their own poor or whether they wished to transfer their assets and claimants to the state. The charities declined to do so; and from lack of money, the provisions relating to the poor relief fund became inoperative as early as 1802. Two years later, the Batavian Republic attempted to reorganize Dutch poor relief by setting up a network of local poor relief committees under the auspices of a national committee. It set out to establish a new sort of large workhouse, a “pauper factory” based on the Hamburg model, in which large numbers of paupers would be set to work. However, the costs turned out to be prohibitive, and there was a host of practical difficulties, so that the plan died a slow death. In 1811 the French government made an attempt to standardize Dutch poor relief, with plans drawn up for “bureaux de bienfaisance”. In each department, the French prefect asked mayors to submit lists of names of candidate members. The defeat of Napoleon and the withdrawal of French troops in 1813 signalled a premature end to that project.^{xxxix}

The Church and the pillars of the old regime – personified by the charity administrators from the elites and upper middle classes – vehemently opposed attempts to create such a state system of poor relief. One regent, a member of Amsterdam’s Roman Catholic charity, asked: “What will happen to the religion of so large a number of needy people, if all they have to do to draw a maintenance allowance is to profess themselves children of the state? How can religion be imprinted on the hearts of orphaned children if the state sees to their support and education? For the state and religion are separate.”^{xl} Furthermore, poor relief could be financed only by an enormous rise in taxes: “Religion moves the hearts of the well-to-do and of those of limited means, of the latter through making them wish to be worthy of relief, and of the former through providing it (...) Amalgamation will stifle religious feelings and will therefore be a considerable disadvantage for society, which can make no charitable provisions except through general taxation. That in itself is a sound reason for keeping the church charities alive.”

As we have already noted, the essential question concerned the separation of Church and State. Poor relief had traditionally been the responsibility of the Church: for Catholics it offered the benefactor a means of salvation, and for both Catholics and Protestants it furnished ecclesiastical office in the footsteps of Christ. It was also a way to avoid losing one's poor parishioners. Making poor relief a state responsibility therefore fundamentally harmed the interests of the Church, for why should benefactors give generously if there were no religious imperative to do so? What fate awaited the poor without religion? How could they be kept within the Church? Another consideration was that many individuals had given money to the Church, sometimes for the express purpose of ensuring their own salvation, and in any case to support ecclesiastical poor relief. Charitable endowments were not state property, but the Church's inalienable legacy.

Was there a right to relief?

Nowhere during the Dutch Republic was there a right to relief in the sense of a right of appeal to an independent body in case a claim was not honoured. In fact Dutch poor relief agencies never acknowledged such a right. During the parliamentary debates on what later became known as the poor law of 1912, an amendment by a socialist member of parliament, which would have led to "relief being provided to those lacking means of subsistence", was rejected by the Lower House by no fewer than 59 votes to 9.^{xli} This amendment was intended to allow paupers to choose between church-based and municipal poor relief: "The relationship between the individual and the Church must be entirely free. If a pauper wishes voluntarily to appeal to his church, fine, then he will do so, but otherwise he won't (...) Perhaps the pauper will, for one reason or another, be denied relief by his church. If, in that case, he then appeals to the municipal charity, which oftentimes will comprise the same individuals as the ecclesiastical charity, the pauper runs the risk of being denied assistance by that municipal charity too, because he was denied relief by the ecclesiastical charity. (...) In such cases, claimants must be allowed a certain degree of discretion, and so I urge: "*Let claimants be free in their choice of to whom to apply. This is especially important for those individuals who no longer wish to have anything to do with a church.*"^{xlii} The minister confirmed that this was the crux of the matter: "What he [Vliegen] wants is a system whereby one can simply apply to the municipal charity and say 'I am destitute; you must help me'. But this would lead to ecclesiastical charity and the charity of individuals being relegated entirely to the background and to the predominance of municipal poor relief."

The minister could "imagine the municipal charity saying: 'that man does nothing apart from drink; one way or other he must be brought to his senses,' but providing relief would not help." He went on to say that "If the municipal charity cannot do this, who else could? Ultimately, it would have to be the court and Vliegen's amendment would lead to the courts in the Netherlands becoming colossal municipal charities."^{xliii} Incidentally, both the minister and Vliegen recognized that in practice civic poor relief would never allow anyone to die from hunger, but unlike the minister Vliegen believed that should be enshrined in law.

Bureaucratisation or not?

After these at times lengthy discussions of the development of poor relief, it is possible to return to the question if poor relief in the Dutch Republic was a bureaucracy or not, and to the degree it was not, if there was a trend towards bureaucratisation over time. As yardsticks we will use the criteria of continuity, professionalism, goal-orientedness and equity. As far as *continuity* was concerned, poor relief was a bureaucracy: even in the harshest of times it did not collapse. With regard to *professionalism*, the answer depends on the organizational model of the relief agency. There were two types of institutions, a professional type with a full time paid (but often not really trained) personnel under supervision of regents, and an amateur one

with unpaid and untrained staff working as volunteers in their spare time. It is difficult to call the latter a bureaucracy. Over time there was *some specialisation* according to welfare risk, as indicated by the growth of orphanages and almshouses, but also an increasing specialisation according to religion and social class. With regard to goal-orientedness, the evidence is also mixed. Ecclesiastical poor relief did raise the welfare of its clients but was primarily seen as a 'Christian's duty' meant to tie clients to the Church; this was not so for municipal relief. Neither type of relief cooperated well with other welfare providers, and to the degree there was cooperation, in the sense of the letters of surety, this had to be enforced by the provinces and was a headache in practice. It appears the costs of administration were relatively low. With regard to equity, contrary to what is sometimes claimed, there generally existed fixed entitlement rights and fixed benefit schemes and while poor relief administrators could in some cases act arbitrarily, they could not do so as a rule. Nowhere, however, there was an institutionalised right of appeal. Whether poor relief was equally open to anyone at risk (who pays the premiums), is difficult to say. All localities favoured residents and the churches favoured co-religionists.

Guild welfare in the Dutch Republic as a bureaucracy

In guild-based welfare, craftsmen and their journeymen had a useful alternative to poor relief. This welfare was the earliest form of mutual help provided by organizations of fellow artisans in the Netherlands; later, in the nineteenth century, it was to be taken over by mutual societies, and in the first half of the twentieth century trade unions too operated social welfare schemes. Mutual welfare among fellow workers thus became an important means of providing welfare for certain groups of workers from the Golden Age right up to the Second World War. Guilds and mutual welfare were around as early as the Middle Ages, but the numbers covered by the guild schemes increased considerably during the Dutch Republic (1588-1795).

Table 6 shows the number of burial insurers in the Netherlands. It is based on the so-called *Bussen*, a database containing information relating to mutual funds in existence between c. 1500 and 1820. In analysing the *Bussen* database we face a number of problems. In several cases the fund predates the start year given in the database. In practice then, the start year is the year in which the fund was first mentioned. If the database gives only one year, our calculations assume this to have been the start year, in which case we do not know when the fund ceased to exist. We do not always know then when a fund actually began and when it ended. If it is unclear whether an insurer existed in the reference year given in the tables, this insurer is excluded from the calculations for that year. A second problem is that for each insurer (for example a specific guild in a particular city) the database gives a single start year and a single end year, even if the database also indicates that several types of insurance were offered. An insurer might actually have offered a particular type of insurance from its inception and another type only later. The data do not allow one to satisfactorily resolve this problem. It is likely to be relatively significant in the case of widows' and old age insurance, which, as a rule, guilds provided only later on, and much less significant in the case of health and burial insurance.

Guild welfare meant, first and foremost, assistance in the event of burial. A guild member expected a dignified funeral, one that would demonstrate to the world the status of his profession. The cortege would wind its way from the home of the deceased to the grave. Guild members acted as pall-bearers, carrying the pall-covered bier on which were also placed the guild's silver shields, if, that is, it had any. The pall-bearers wore mourning mantles and jabots; the other guild members wore dark cloaks. Heading the procession was a guild journeyman. Sometimes the guild also provided an allowance to cover expenses.

For the sick, poor relief was the principal source of welfare in terms of the number of recipients. Poor relief also provided allowances to the sick and incapacitated, as well as

offering free medical treatment to a larger group. The medieval charitable legacy began to flourish during the Dutch Republic. Calvin had argued that the welfare of the sick was a diaconal responsibility, and the Dutch Calvinist poor relief board adopted this view. Catholic poor relief boards also provided for their poor, sick co-religionists.

Having said that, it remains true that guild-based sickness benefits had existed from as early as the end of the Middle Ages (later, other bodies, principally open to fellow craftsmen, but with voluntary membership, also provided such benefits). The guilds provided benefits to members to compensate for loss of income in the event of sickness, as well as providing them with a physician. Here too, a medieval legacy was significantly and successfully extended over time. In the cities where the guilds operated, the percentage of recipients was higher than elsewhere. While guild-based support benefited the urban craftsmen, the lower classes (the poor and the lower middle classes) were served by poor relief. The rural population benefited from neither. In the cities, from the mid-seventeenth century members of mutual schemes normally received two to three guilders for each week that they were sick. In the few cases for which data are available, we can conclude that this constituted roughly a quarter to a half of their normal earnings, see table 7. These sickness benefits were thus far from sufficient to compensate entirely for loss of income, but nor were they insignificant. These benefits were two to three times as high as poor relief, and enabled the insured and their families to survive, albeit in reduced circumstances.

Three factors underlay the successful expansion of this medieval health insurance tradition during the Dutch Republic: prosperity, the Reformation, and corporatism. Growing prosperity enabled more and more workers to afford the health insurance premiums charged by the guilds and other mutual schemes. The Reformation played a dual role in this respect. First, the Calvinist state abolished Catholic holy days, increasing at a stroke the number of working days and thus the earnings capacity of workers and their ability to pay health insurance premiums. Secondly, the state abolished the saints themselves, or at least the religious festivals associated with them, so freeing up the large sums of money previously allocated by the guilds to those festivities; this money was used instead to augment the guild funds. Thirdly, the Dutch Republic's corporatist political structure was founded on corporations such as the guilds, and so town governments allowed the guilds unprecedented scope to perform their responsibilities as insurers. Compulsory guild membership was the rule: in many sectors of the urban economy craftsmen were forced to join a guild in order to work, see table 7. And many guilds required their members to join the guild's health insurance scheme. Hence, the guild schemes quickly secured enough participants while, moreover, avoiding the problem of adverse selection. Guilds, and similar organizations restricted to a homogenous group, were already in a relatively strong position to limit the problem of moral hazards: members knew one another, and it was in all their interests to ensure that none of their collective money was wasted on malingerers. A waiting period of one week limited moral hazards further, see table 7.

The mutuals remained vulnerable to the problem of correlated risks though: an epidemic could hit a large number of members simultaneously and exhaust the reserves. Setting a maximum benefit duration of around eighteen months limited this problem to some extent, but in practice this shielded the mutuals only from extended claims from those with lingering illnesses. On the other hand the mutuals also tended to interpret benefit payment rules flexibly. Table 8 provides an example. While sometimes generous in cases where no benefit payment could be expected, in other cases they might reduce the level or duration of benefit if their reserves threatened to run out. They also set a maximum to the number of benefit recipients, turning down new applicants. This probably applied chiefly to the relatively expensive widows' and old age pensions, but it might also occasionally have happened in the case of sickness. If the number of sick members was too high in relation to

the available reserves, contributions might be raised. This flexible benefit payment policy – a form, in effect, of legal uncertainty – was of bitter necessity: without it, the Dutch health insurance fund tradition built up over so many centuries would not have survived.

The economic stagnation experienced by the Dutch Republic affected not only the organization of poor relief as we have seen, but the guild system too. Initially, town governments competed with one another in recruiting craftsmen, but the seventeenth century saw a “corporatist reflex”.⁸ Urban politics took on protectionist features, mainly in the form of labour-market regulations benefiting the established citizenry. Some town governments imposed stricter rules on granting citizenship (*poorterschap*), a precondition of guild membership. During the Batavian Republic, patriots were fiercely critical of corporatism in general and of guild welfare in particular. In the debates of the National Assembly in 1796 and 1797 advocates of laissez-faire argued in favour of abolishing the guilds, claiming they led to intolerably high wage costs and high prices. Their opponents preferred reform, arguing that abolishing the guilds would also put an end to the mutual insurance they provided. The guilds were eventually abolished under the 1797 Constitution and gradually, between 1798 and 1820, most of them disappeared.

The abolition of the guilds seemed to undermine security for craftsmen and their journeymen, and for the male working population more generally, especially in the Dutch cities to the west. Compulsory membership had been the key to the success of the guild and journeymen funds, partly because it solved the classic problem of adverse selection. What now emerged was a “completely open market for insuring the risks of life”.⁹

Was guild welfare a bureaucracy?

As in the case of poor relief we will measure the degree to which guild welfare was a bureaucracy using the four criteria of continuity, professionalism, goal-orientedness and equity. The first criterion is *continuity*. The number of mutual insurance arrangements – of which the overwhelming majority was guild based – increased steadily over time. Once in business, a guild welfare scheme seldom discontinued. However the end of the Dutch Republic, with a small delay meant the end of the guilds and of guild based welfare. The second criterion is *professionalism*. Guilds were run for and by their members, and although we know less than we would like to know about their day to day operation, in theory at least the staff consisted of unpaid guild members without special training and supervised only at a distance by the town government. The degree of specialisation increased somewhat over time in the sense that different schemes per welfare risk evolved, without however the use of the then unknown morbidity tables or with little use of the then known life tables. The guild welfare arrangements often did, however, contain simple but smart measures to deal with classic insurance problems. With regard to *goal-orientedness*, guild welfare schemes were primarily meant to raise the welfare of the clients, certainly if this is taken to include a dignified burial without costs for the remaining family. Much is in the dark about the costs of administration, but it is true (although not discussed here) that in Amsterdam over the years the income from premiums and other forms of guild income together was higher than the expenditure, with the guilds thus building a capital. This capital could very well have been used in the nineteenth century to pay for guild welfare. The abolition of the guilds was not because their welfare arrangements were financially unsound, quite the contrary. There was a modicum of cooperation with other welfare providers: after enjoying the relatively high but short lived guild entitlements sick guild members could enjoy poor relief to the same degree as non-guild members. As guilds were local, there was no cooperation with guild in other places. A guild member who changed places, changes guilds and lost his entitlements without compensation. With regard to *equity*, not only were the guild welfare arrangements equally

open to any guild member who had paid the premiums, in many instances guild members were obliged to pay premiums. The entitlement rights and the benefit schemes were not invariably fixed in the sense of following written regulations or well established practices. And even if they were, they were the fruit of mutual consent and the members could, and did, change them if deemed necessary. This could mean that someone was given benefits over and above his (or in the case of widows, her) entitlements. It could also mean that if a flood of claims emptied the coffers, some or all claimants were given less, or even nothing at all. Unfair as this may seem, it was done through a decision of the guild members and without such 'flexibility' guild welfare could not have survived over the long years it did. We know little about claims of appeal. In last resort, a guild member could request the city government to look into his case.

Debate

The bodies that, in many respects, protected Dutch citizens also denied them rights though. Opposition to this reached a head towards the end of the eighteenth century. The burgeoning middle class sought to protect itself against risks and were resentful of the benefits accorded to the elite, such as patronage. Under the influence of the Enlightenment, and galvanized by the War of American Independence, for the first time in the Republic's history a concept of "universal citizenship" emerged – one not tied to the privileges of place, status, or religion – the ideal of a country liberated from the privileges of the regents. The conflagration of the French Revolution, with its seductive slogan of "liberty, equality, fraternity", ultimately brought about the revolutionary Batavian and French governments, which laid the foundation of the unitary state. Patriots attacked the roots of corporatism; corporatist welfare came under considerable pressure, and guild welfare disappeared in the Kingdom of the Netherlands. Poor relief also came under attack and proposal to confiscate charitable property were drafted and even turned in law, but the law remained a dead letter.

Religious denomination was seldom a reason to exclude an applicant from membership of a guild or guild fund (Jews were the exception, and Catholics were sometimes excluded from board positions). In the case of poor relief, the situation was different. Poor relief was grounded in religious faith and organized on a denominational basis. Each denomination was obliged to give alms to its fellow co-religionists, but not to those of other denominations. Guild-based welfare was grounded in the organization of labour. Craftsmen were obliged to help the needy in the same sector, in the same guild, but not to support members of other guilds. As soon as guild membership ceased to be compulsory but voluntary, more denominational funds emerged similar to that in Leiden. On the whole, the guilds transcended the religious divisions of the Dutch population, while poor relief transcended occupational divisions.

It is an intriguing question why poor relief continued but guild welfare was ended, as both were under attack. In my view the answer to this question may very well be that although both poor relief and guild welfare were corporatist institutions, and as such came under revolutionary fire, poor relief institutions were more than just corporative institutions, they were also, in part, religious institutions.

Table 1 Essential characteristics of Dutch social services in the twentieth century

First half of the century

Risks:	industrial accident, sickness, medical expenses, invalidity, old age, death, costs of children
Recipients:	workers
Legal form:	compulsory and voluntary social insurance, entitlement
Type of help:	money and in kind
Duration of help:	dependent on duration of risk
Degree of help:	wage-related benefits
Conditions:	income-eligibility limits, degree of occupational disability, age, employment history
Administrators:	national government, organizations of employers and employees
Implementation:	government agencies (National Insurance Bank, Labour Councils), employers and employees (industrial insurance boards), health-insurance schemes
Financing:	contributions (employers and employees)

Later half of the century

Risks:	<i>occupational disability</i> , sickness, medical expenses, invalidity, old age, death, costs of children, <i>unemployment, hardship</i>
Recipients:	workers, <i>entire population</i>
Legal form:	compulsory and voluntary social insurance, <i>welfare benefits</i> , entitlement
Type of help:	money and in kind
Duration of help:	dependent on duration of risk
Degree of help:	wage-related benefits, <i>benefits at the level of the social minimum</i>
Conditions:	income-eligibility limits, degree of occupational disability, age, employment history, <i>size of family, assets, availability for work, obligation to work</i>
Administrators:	national government, organizations of employers and employees
Implementation:	<i>municipalities</i> , government agencies (Labour Councils, Social Insurance Council), employers and employees (industrial insurance boards), health-insurance schemes
Financing:	contributions (employers and employees), <i>general funds</i>

Table 2**Essential characteristics of poor relief in the Dutch Republic**

Risks:	all cases of poverty, especially those involving large underemployed families, old age, sickness or invalidity, and widowhood
Recipients:	local residents and practising church members
Legal form:	custom, often involving formal arrangements
Type of help:	money, food, fuel medical assistance and sometimes housing
Duration of help:	as long as the recipient remained in poverty
Degree of help:	variable but insufficient to live off, except for shamefaced poor and institutional poor
Conditions:	number of years domiciled (resident), number of years in the church, and other conditions relating to gender, age, number of children, and personal conduct
Administrators:	local, civic and ecclesiastical charities managed by the middle and upper-middle classes
Implementation:	unpaid board, sometimes with paid staff and sometimes with volunteers
Financing:	gifts, interest on own capital, sometimes subsidy from local government

Table 3 Essential characteristics of guild welfare in the Dutch Republic

Mutual life and health insurance

Risks:	sickness and death (burial costs), sometimes widowhood and old age
Recipients:	chiefly craftsmen and their journeymen, in some cases later, general
Legal form:	membership, compulsory for guilds and sometimes too for journeymen funds, with rights and obligations set out in regulations, but subject to change and therefore uncertain
Type of help:	money, and attendance at burials
Duration of help:	variable
Degree of help:	more generous than poor relief
Conditions:	degree of hardship, age, health, number of years' membership
Administrators:	representatives of recipients
Implementation:	unpaid board with paid staff, doctors contracted
Financing:	initially ad hoc, later contributions, pay-as-you-go or capital funding

Table 4 Essential characteristics of help from neighbours, friends and family in the Dutch Republic

Risks:	chiefly maternity, sickness, death, and poverty
Recipients:	neighbours, family, and friends in the widest sense
Legal form:	goodwill, sometimes involving formal arrangements
Type of help:	services and sometimes items
Duration of help:	variable
Degree of help:	generally limited
Conditions:	reciprocity; sometimes formal arrangements
Administrators:	neighbours, friends and relatives, local organisations
Implementation:	informal, but local guilds too in urban areas, and neighbourhood communities in rural areas
Financing:	gifts, sometimes collections or contributions

Table 5**Main dimensions of welfare bureaucracy**

<i>Continuity</i>	In operation during the whole period
<i>Professionalism</i>	Paid and trained personnel Under supervision With specialisation according to welfare risk
<i>Goal-orientated</i>	Primarily meant to raise the welfare of the clients With relatively low costs of administration Cooperating with other welfare providers
<i>Equity</i>	Equally open to anyone at risk (who pays the premiums) Fixed entitlement rights With right of appeal Fixed benefit schemes With right of appeal

Table 6 **Number of mutual life and health insurance funds in the Dutch Republic per type of risk**

Year	Burial	Sickness benefit	Medical costs	Total
1550	4	6	0	7
1600	18	27	0	33
1650	57	74	5	105
1700	100	111	11	161
1750	191	176	25	276
1795	258	211	35	354

Source: Van Leeuwen, *Risico's van de Republiek*, XXX, based on the *Bussen* database, IISH.

NB The data are incomplete, especially for earlier periods: the numbers are thus minimum numbers. An insurer providing more than one type of insurance is included just once in the "Total" column.

Key:

Sickness benefit = compensation for loss of wages
 Medical costs = cost of medical treatment

Table 7 **Examples of criteria for guild welfare in the Dutch Republic: burial allowances and widows' and old age pensions, c. 1750**

	Amsterdam			Utrecht		Leiden	
	S	SW	P	MC	JC	W	LG
<i>Cost in guilders</i>							
Initial fee	150-250	56-77	10	69	0	1	1
Annual premium	5	7-12	4	2	5	5	5
Average cost per annum (over 30 years)	10-13	8-14	4	4	5	5	5
<i>Payment conditions</i>							
Compulsory membership	+	+	+	+	-	-	-
Max. age on joining	-	30-32	60	-	50	30	40
Waiting period in weeks burial insurance	58	.	.	.	52	26	26
Widows' pension	.	.	Min. 45 yr
Old age pension	.	Min. 60 yr	Max. 45 pensioners	.	.	Min. Max. 18 mths 12 yr member	
<i>Allowance in guilders</i>							
Burial allowance	30	.	.	30	36	30	32
Widows' pension, per week	3	.	1.6
Old age pension, per week	3	3	3.5	.	.	1.8	1.5
<i>Also insured for</i>							
Burial costs	+	-	-	+	+	+	+
Widows' pension	+	-	+	-	-	-	-
Old age pension	+	+	+	-	-	+	+
Sickness benefit	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Cost of medical treatment	-	-	-	-	-	+	-

Source: Calculations based on Bos, “*Uyt liefde tot malcander*”, p. 337, and wage data.

NB The initial fee covered all guild services. The annual premium covered the full insurance package.

Key

S	Surgeons guild	SW	Shipwrights guild
P	Peat-porters guild	MC	Master carpenters guild
JC	Journeyman carpenters association	W	Journeyman woolcombers
LG	Beurs der Leydsche Gerechtigheyd, a mutual association of Leiden's Calvinists		

Table 8 **An example of institutionalised ‘flexibility’ or ‘arbitrariness’ of guild welfare in the Dutch Republic: the Leeuwarden bricklayers and masons guild, c. 1750**

No. of recipients	Assistance	Total annual allowance in guilders
1 widow and no master	100 guilders if she were in “real need”, otherwise 80 guilders	80-100
1 master and no widow	100 guilders	100
1 master and 1 widow	80 guilder to each	160
2 masters and 1 widow	60 guilders to each	180
1 master and 2 widows	70 guilders for the master 60 guilders per widow	190
2 masters and 2 widows	65 guilders per master 60 guilders per widow	250
2 masters and 3 widows	60 guilders per master 55 guilders per widow	285
3 masters and 3 widows	55 guilders per master 50 guilders per widow	315
3 masters and 4 widows	50 guilders per master 45 guilders per widow	330
3 masters and 5 widows	45 guilders per master 40 guilders per widow	335
in excess of this	40 guilders per person	

Source: Mud, “Het Leeuwarden metselaars- en steenhouwersgilde”, p. 90.

ⁱ dvwdw
ⁱⁱ

19...See Van Nierop, 'Popular participation in politics in the Dutch Republic', and Prak, *Republikeinse veelheid, democratisch enkelvoud*; 'Burghers into citizens' as well as 'Citizens, inhabitants and aliens'

20...Prak, *Republikeinse veelheid, democratisch enkelvoud*, 23.

ⁱⁱⁱ The only occasion in Amsterdam's early-modern history on which the city council was actually elected was in 1578, when the city abjured its Catholic Habsburg sovereign Philip II and joined the Protestant rebels. At a stroke, the council was purged. Amid the crisis, the militia companies were permitted to elect the 36 members of the *vroedschap*, the city council, though it was explicitly stated at the same time that this election was a one-off affair. It was not until the nineteenth century that the next council election was held, and even then it was only indirect; it was not until the middle of the twentieth century that Amsterdam's city council was directly elected. See Prak, "Citizens, inhabitants and aliens".

^{iv} Van Nierop, "Popular Participation in Politics in the Dutch Republic", pp. 286-287.

^v

^{vi}

^{vii}

^{viii} Even in the case of municipal relief agencies this was generally so. From the late nineteenth century onwards, municipal governments were increasingly successful obtaining control over these formally independent bodies and incorporating them into the municipal administration. Still, on the verge of the introduction of the Algemene Bijstandswet of 1965, there were still quite a few municipal poor relief agencies that formally were independent bodies. This was, incidentally, now much to the pleasure of the municipalities who rather kept the charitable coffers for local purposes rather than hand them over to the state to fund the expenses under the new law, see xxxx.

^{ix}

^x

^{xi}

^{xii}

^{xiii}

^{xiv} Olson, *The logic*.

^{xv} The following is based largely on Prak, "Armenzorg 1500-1800", pp. 54; Israel, *The Dutch Republic*, pp. 123-124; Spaans, *Armenzorg in Friesland*, pp. 26-29, 367 ff.,

^{xvi} Rivière, "De armenzorg in Nederland"; Adriani, "Johannes Ludovicus Vives".

^{xvii} See Nusteling, *Welvaart en werkgelegenheid in Amsterdam, 1540-1860*, p. 161.

^{xviii} Prak, "Armenzorg 1500-1800", pp. 57 ff.; Spaans, *Armenzorg in Friesland*, pp. 17, 367-368; de Vries and van der Woude, *The First Modern Economy*, pp. 655 ff.; Israel, *The Dutch Republic*, pp. 353-360.

^{xix} See Nusteling, *Welvaart en werkgelegenheid in Amsterdam, 1540-1860*, p. 161.

^{xx} Galatians 6: 10. This biblical passage was displayed for example in the offices of the Reformed Charity in Amsterdam. See van Leeuwen, *The Logic of Charity*, p. 88.

^{xxi} See Groenveld, *Wezen en boeftjes*, pp. 130-135.

^{xxii} Spijker, 'Van Aalmoes tot bijstand on the city of Haarlem; Van Baar en Noordegraaf on the city of Alkmaar, 'Werkschuwheid'; Adriaens, *De magistraat on the city of Nijmegen*; 't Hart, *De stad Utrecht*, 74-99; Kool-Blokland, *De zorg gewogen*, on the city of Middelburg; Spaans, *Armenzorg in Friesland*, on six Frisian cities. The same applies to specialised institutions such as orphanages, see McCants, *Civic charity*, on Amsterdam and Groenvel, *Wezen en boeffjes*, 114-130 on the Dutch Republic in general.

^{xxiii} Meischke, *Het R.C. Maagdenhuis*, 2.

^{xxiv}Data from my 'Cultures of giving'.

^{xxv} Pot, *Arm Leiden*, 170; Douwes, *Armenkerk*, 125.

^{xxvi} Davids, 'Migratie te Leiden', in particular 174.

^{xxvii} Gras, *Op de grens van het bestaan; Voorst van Beest, De katholieke armenzorg te Rotterdam*.

^{xxviii} Quoted in Davids, 'Migratie te Leiden', 187 footnote 16.

^{xxix} The States of Utrecht in 1687, Zeeland in 1705, Overijssel in 1767 and the Estates-General acting for Limburg and Brabant in 1792, Luttenberg, *Vervolg*, 13-15, 41-42 and 49-53.

^{xxx} Quoted in Davids, 'Migratie te Leiden', 147.

^{xxxi} Quoted in Van Voorst van Beest, *Katholieke armenzorg*, 11-12.

^{xxxii} The following section is based partly on De Vries and Van der Woude, *Nederland 1500-1815*, 95-103, 724-762 and in particular 755-6.

^{xxxiii} Davids, 'Migratie te Leiden', 149; Melief, *Strijd om de armenzorg*, 74.

^{xxxiv} The following section is based in part on Heerma van Voss, *De armenzorg te Amsterdam*, in particular 58 and 69 claims on poor relief in 1682, 45 poor relief as a pull factor, 46-7 distribution of peat to the Huguenots.

^{xxxv} Heerma van Voss, 'De armenzorg te Amsterdam', 107.

^{xxxvi} See van Leeuwen, *Logic of Charity*, pp. 24-28, and 50-53, and Gouda, *Poverty*, ch. 2.

^{xxxvii} De Jong, "Grondwet en kerken", p. 7; the Constitution of 1805 had a similar provision. *Ibid.*, p. 11.

^{xxxviii} Luttenberg, *Vervolg op het Groot Plakkaatboek*, pp. 59-60 and 63-64; Van Leeuwen, *Logic of Charity*, p. 52; for what follows see *ibid.*, pp. 155-158, and van Leeuwen, *Bijstand in Amsterdam*, pp. 104-106 and 318-319

^{xxxix} These efforts met with greater success in the south of the Netherlands and in Belgium

^{xl} Van Leeuwen, *The Logic of Charity*, p. 51

^{xli} Goeman Borgesius, *Nieuwe Armenwet*, p. 119

^{xlii} *Ibid.*, p. 115 (my italics).

^{xliii} *Ibid.*, pp. 134 and 116.

8. See also Vries and Van der Woude, *Nederland 1500-1815*, 674; Israël, *De Republiek*, II', 1145 ff. De uitdrukking 'corporatieve reflex' is van Prak, *Republikeinse veelvoud*.

9. Van Genabeek, *Met vereende kracht risico's verzacht*, 81.